Boko Haram and transnational politics: The efforts of GEJ and the insights of PMB. Written by Okechukwu C. Uju-Azorji, Esq.

Boko Haram and transnational politics: The efforts of GEJ and the insights of PMB. Written by Okechukwu C. Uju-Azorji, Esq.

It is now an incontrovertible fact of history that the Boko Haram insurgency started in 2009, when the jihadist rebel group started an armed rebellion against the Nigerian Government. Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. That changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group's activities following reports that its members were arming themselves. Prior to that, the government reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization. When the government came into action, several members of the group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated 700 people. During the fighting with the security forces, Boko Haram fighters reportedly used “fuel-laden motorcycles” and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station (this is incomparable with the sophisticated weapons the group is fighting with today, including their deadliest weapon, suicide bombing). The group's founder and then leader, Mohammed Yusuf was killed during this time while still in police custody. After Mohammed Yusuf's death, Abubakar Shekau became the leader and still holds the position as at July, 2015. Today, this group unarguably has several sophisticated weapons in their armoury, and their activities have since spread beyond Nigerian borders, to its neighbours in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. In 2013, more than 1,000 people died in the war. The violence escalated dramatically in 2014, with 10,849 deaths, and this menace still lives with us to this day. It is against this background that this writer ex-rays the efforts of two Nigerian leaders, former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (GEJ), and President Mohammadu Buhari, GCFR (PMB), in the fight against this jihadist group. 

Goodluck Ebele Jonathan has had a chequered history in the ascendancy to the highest level of Nigerian politics, becoming the Vice President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from 2007 to 2010. He subsequently became the Acting President in February, 2010, and President in May same year, following the death of his boss, former President Umar Musa Yar’Adua. He would soon nominate the then Kaduna State Governor, Namadi Sambo, as the Vice President, and together, the both would be saddled with piloting the affairs of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, including the fight against Boko Haram, from 2010 to 2015, after the two had ran on a joint ticket in the 2011 general elections. It is instructive to note that shortly before GEJ was sworn in as Acting President in February, 2010, in the days of the uncertainty surrounding the health of the then President Umar Musa Yar’Adua, and after the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January, 2010, which resulted in the killing of four people. Since then, the violence has only escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity. Equally, in September, 2010, and with then President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan now fully settled, a Bauchi prison break freed more than 700 Boko Haram militants, thereby replenishing their force. On 29^th May, 2011, a few hours after Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was sworn in as President, several bombings purportedly by Boko Haram killed 15 and injured 55. On 16 June, 2011, Boko Haram claimed to have conducted the Abuja Police Headquarters bombing, the first known suicide attack in Nigeria. Two months later, the United Nations’ building in Abuja was bombed, in an attack aimed at getting international attention. In December, the group carried out attacks in Damaturu, the Yobe State capital, killing over a 100 people, subsequently clashing with security forces in same month, resulting in at least 68 deaths. Two days later on Christmas Day, Boko Haram attacked several Christian churches with bomb blasts and shootings- to chronicle the affairs of the militant group thus far. Through these periods to early 2013, there was no meaningful effort by the GEJ administration at combating this insurgency, as he demonstrated his lack of experience in military tactics, he was totally clueless. This only saw meteoric rise in the activities of the group, with the then President only coming out, after each bomb attack to claim that his government was “on top of the situation”, even without clue as to what next to do. He subsequently declared a state of emergency in the three worst hit States of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, and an offensive was launched by the Nigerian governmental forces against the group. The offensive reportedly had initial success, but the Boko Haram group soon regained strength and launched even more heinous attacks in Nigerian history, from massacring students in Yobe, to seizing the towns of Baga, Bama, Michika, Gwoza, Damboa, Monguno, Danbogu, the impregnable Sambisa Forest, and even proclaiming a Caliphate in Nigerian territory. They would in April, 2014 kidnap the foremost Chibok School Girls, and in same Month claimed responsibility for the Nyanya, Abuja bomb blast, where the writer lost a former classmate and the only son of his parents.

Concerned fora like the Northern Elders Forum, a socio-political organization, had in 2012 submitted a document to the then President, where they identified the Boko Haram insurgency as a major national issue and made several recommendations from both the security, political and socio-economic aspects. Amongst their recommendation in respect of the security aspect was for GEJ to rather employ dialogue in the fight against Boko Haram. GEJ seemed to have bought into this idea of dialogue at first, but had to succumb when the pressure came from some quarters that he was dialoguing with those who wanted to Islamize Nigeria. He dropped the idea, and that was when he came up with the idea of state of emergency which was in force up to May, 2014. The idea of dialogue to me might not have been a totally bad one if it had been properly positioned and understood. Remember the uprising of the Niger Delta militants then. You would agree with me that Nigeria only saw light at the end of the tunnel when the Nigerian government presented a peaceful picture to the militants, and made it clear that the government was no longer at war with them, and called them out to negotiate. It was through this negotiation that the reasons for the agitations of the militants became known, when they showed the Nigerian government that they produced billions of dollars for the Nigerian government from their backyards, yet they lacked everything. Before this dialogue, the Joint Task Force (JTF) which had held sway in the region practically achieved no stability. In the case of the Boko Haram insurgents, the idea of dialogue here, to me, would not have been that the government would call out the faceless insurgents and start negotiating with them. No, that would not have been feasible and achievable. What the idea of dialogue in that instance would have meant would be the Nigerian government making it clear that it was no longer at war with the insurgents and in the mean time, stop every form of offensive against them, and deploy the secret service agents to infiltrate the towns and villages where the insurgents had held sway, with a view to gathering credible intelligence concerning the group, including their perceived agitations, their sponsors, and a possible way to assuage their demands. By this, people who knew and had lived with the insurgents would have the confidence to speak out. The Nigerian government in the end would have gathered enough intelligence on what the perceived agitations of the insurgents are, and the best way to assuage them. Aside the meaning of the full name of the group, which simply means that “Western education is evil”, nobody knows what the group is fighting for to this day. The Joint Task Force employed in the stead of dialogue did not achieve much, as it was merely an occupation force which only instilled fear in the communities where they operated, rather than instilling confidence in them. Only this confidence would have enabled information gathering in these communities.

Characteristic of the corruption which had become rife in his administration, the fight against Boko Haram soon became another avenue for feeding fat in the vast Nigerian resources, mainly by the Service Chiefs, and the National Security Adviser. The writer came to startling revelations in this respect when he had cause to represent Col. D.B Dazang at the General Court-Marshal in Abuja, and in the matter pending against the NSA at the Federal High Court in Abuja. These particular incidents revealed the mess in the purported fight against the Boko Haram insurgency, and why the fight could not be won under GEJ’s watch. The Service Chiefs would each time approach GEJ with a view to selling different ideas to him for the fight against the insurgency, with the aim of only getting approval for fat sums which they eventually transfer to their bank accounts. Always, GEJ without clue in respect of such ideas sold to him only approved, including having to additionally borrow $1 billion in the purported fight. The NSA would sabotage any arrangement by the Service Chiefs or any such purported award of contract for the purchase of any weapon unless his cut had been agreed on. The fact that unconfirmed report today has it that N3 trillion had been traced to the accounts of Sambo Dasuki, the NSA under GEJ lends credence to this. The soldiers were therefore not equipped for any battle against the insurgents who carried more sophisticated weapons; those who had the gut to complain over such apparent suicide missions they were being sent on in the name of the fight against the insurgents were court-marshaled and sentenced to death, so that the business can go on. GEJ never approached the Nigerian neighbours or the UN in the fight, and was at no point, the real Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. I wonder if he ever gave a single command himself throughout the purported fight under his watch. Compare this for instance with President Bush during the 9/11 attack of the US when two hijacked planes had hit the twin towers of the World Trade Center in a suicide attack, with another intelligence that a 3^rd hijacked plane was on the loose. The most viable option then was to shoot down this plane, even though it carried Americans, but the Military Chiefs needed the Orders of the President first before the Fighter Jets could be deployed for that purpose. The American Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces rose to the occasion, and the plane was eventually brought down, though not by American Fighter Jets, but by the passengers themselves- that’s the American spirit.       

No doubt, the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency had been caught in the web of Nigerian national politics, reminiscent of our political level. There had been recriminations at both ends of the divide, represented by the North and South. The Northerners had consistently accused the South and GEJ’s government of politicizing the fight against Boko Haram, with a bid to winning GEJ a re-election in 2015. Even the international communities appeared to have equally seen it as such, as they withdrew their support. The US blatantly refused to sell arms to Nigeria as a result of this. On the other hand, the South accused the North, including the incumbent President that they created Boko Haram because they lost power and wanted to gain it back. Today, the fact that the insurgency group is going about killing both northerners and southerners, Christians and Muslims, has cast serious doubt as to any merit in this accusation by the South against the North. The truth remains that Gwoza, Bama, Baga remain the most devastated today by reason of this insurgency, and not any Southern town; to say the least of any agenda. Certain quarters of Nigeria even believed the incumbent President had a hand in Boko Haram, and even when they did not support him in his electioneering campaign, they believed that if he won, he would talk to ‘his boys’ to stop. But the fact today remains that Boko Haram again struck in Maiduguri some twelve hours after PMB took oath of office, defying such shared sentiments. The attacks have since continued in Borno, Yobe, Kaduna and Adamawa. Thus, it is now obvious that the insurgency is a menace we must all fight, as it is no longer anybody’s agenda. The fight must transcend our national boundaries if we must win same

To this effect, the effort of PMB since his inauguration on May 29, 2015 is most commendable. He did not have to think before knowing that a fight of this magnitude cannot be won with the Military Chiefs giving orders from their lush mansions in Abuja, a strategy which GEJ had no clue to. If the Military Command Headquarters had been in Maiduguri all this while, it would no doubt, have instilled a sense of responsibility in the Military Chiefs. They would not need a necromancer to tell them that being in enemy territory, they could also become statistics if they failed to discharge their duties diligently. That is why the moving of the Military Command Headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri by PMB is a first attempt at winning the war, and that shows mastery. He had since visited Nigerian neighbours of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger Republic, to solicit their support in the fight against Boko Haram. I consider this a welcome development also because, as I have had course to say elsewhere, no matter how poor these countries may be, the fact remained that during GEJ’s regime, the Armies of these countries were better organized than that of Nigeria. It is immaterial the feat the Nigerian Army had achieved in the past in peace keeping missions. This became evident when, in the bid to protect their own borders, they joined the Nigerian troops towards the tail end of GEJ’s administration. The Nigerian troops arguably started winning the fight principally by the efforts of these Countries. With their cooperation, more feats would be achieved in the fight, as there would not be any hiding place for the insurgents when they are driven out of a particular location. PMB has equally approached the international community, who have pledged their support in the fight. Since the inauguration of PMB, Canada, USA, UK, and France have since pledged their support for his administration. He had met the America President, and there are a whole lot of invitations pending for him from different Heads of State. 

On the part of Nigeria, if this collective effort must yield the desired result in the effort to win the war, the fight must transcend our national boundaries, and we should eschew politicizing it. Nigerians must see the insurgency as a common problem, and every effort channeled towards the fight should be appreciated, including the sacrifices of Nigerian soldiers. To this effect, no section of the country should see the appointment of military chiefs or such security chiefs in the fight as an attempt to propagate the agenda of any particular region or nation. We should be confident in the efforts of PMB to succeed in the fight against Boko Haram, and respect his choices of personnel.

Having said all these, on the other hand, if you ask me if I see PMB winning the war in four years, I would tell you that the greatest undoing of Nigeria in the first place was to allow the terrorist group grow from a splinter group to an armed group this day. I blame the Nigerian secret service agencies for this neglect. I say this because I have never seen any terrorist organization completely disintegrate after its formation. To this end, if PMB is able to infiltrate their ranks, weaken them and make it impossible for them to utilize their major weapon, suicide bombing in the next four years, I would say he had succeeded in the fight against Boko Haram.