Boko Haram
and transnational politics: The efforts of GEJ and the insights of PMB. Written
by Okechukwu C. Uju-Azorji, Esq.
It is now an incontrovertible fact of history that the Boko Haram insurgency started in 2009, when the jihadist rebel group started an armed rebellion against the Nigerian Government. Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully during the first seven years of its existence. That changed in 2009 when the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the group's activities following reports that its members were arming themselves. Prior to that, the government reportedly repeatedly ignored warnings about the increasingly militant character of the organization. When the government came into action, several members of the group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking deadly clashes with Nigerian security forces which led to the deaths of an estimated 700 people. During the fighting with the security forces, Boko Haram fighters reportedly used “fuel-laden motorcycles” and "bows with poison arrows" to attack a police station (this is incomparable with the sophisticated weapons the group is fighting with today, including their deadliest weapon, suicide bombing). The group's founder and then leader, Mohammed Yusuf was killed during this time while still in police custody. After Mohammed Yusuf's death, Abubakar Shekau became the leader and still holds the position as at July, 2015. Today, this group unarguably has several sophisticated weapons in their armoury, and their activities have since spread beyond Nigerian borders, to its neighbours in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. In 2013, more than 1,000 people died in the war. The violence escalated dramatically in 2014, with 10,849 deaths, and this menace still lives with us to this day. It is against this background that this writer ex-rays the efforts of two Nigerian leaders, former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (GEJ), and President Mohammadu Buhari, GCFR (PMB), in the fight against this jihadist group.
Goodluck Ebele
Jonathan has had a chequered history in the ascendancy to the highest level of
Nigerian politics, becoming the Vice President of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria from 2007 to 2010. He subsequently became the Acting President in
February, 2010, and President in May same year, following the death of his
boss, former President Umar Musa Yar’Adua. He would soon nominate the then
Kaduna State Governor, Namadi Sambo, as the Vice President, and together, the
both would be saddled with piloting the affairs of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, including the fight against Boko
Haram, from 2010 to 2015, after the two had ran on a joint ticket in the
2011 general elections. It is instructive to note that shortly before GEJ was
sworn in as Acting President in February, 2010, in the days of the uncertainty
surrounding the health of the then President Umar Musa Yar’Adua, and after the
killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram
group carried out its first terrorist attack in Borno in January, 2010, which
resulted in the killing of four people. Since then, the violence has only
escalated in terms of both frequency and intensity. Equally, in September,
2010, and with then President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan now fully settled, a Bauchi
prison break freed more than 700 Boko
Haram militants, thereby replenishing their force. On 29th May,
2011, a few hours after Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was sworn in as President, several
bombings purportedly by Boko Haram
killed 15 and injured 55. On 16 June, 2011, Boko
Haram claimed to have conducted the Abuja Police Headquarters bombing, the
first known suicide attack in Nigeria. Two months later, the United Nations’
building in Abuja was bombed, in an attack aimed at getting international
attention. In December, the group carried out attacks in Damaturu, the Yobe
State capital, killing over a 100 people, subsequently clashing with security
forces in same month, resulting in at least 68 deaths. Two days later on Christmas
Day, Boko Haram attacked several
Christian churches with bomb blasts and shootings- to chronicle the affairs of
the militant group thus far. Through these periods to early 2013, there was no
meaningful effort by the GEJ administration at combating this insurgency, as he
demonstrated his lack of experience in military tactics, he was totally
clueless. This only saw meteoric rise in the activities of the group, with the
then President only coming out, after each bomb attack to claim that his
government was “on top of the situation”, even without clue as to what next to
do. He subsequently declared a state of emergency in the three worst hit States
of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, and an offensive was launched by the Nigerian
governmental forces against the group. The offensive reportedly had initial
success, but the Boko Haram group
soon regained strength and launched even more heinous attacks in Nigerian
history, from massacring students in Yobe, to seizing the towns of Baga, Bama,
Michika, Gwoza, Damboa, Monguno, Danbogu, the impregnable Sambisa Forest, and
even proclaiming a Caliphate in Nigerian territory. They would in April, 2014
kidnap the foremost Chibok School Girls, and in same Month claimed
responsibility for the Nyanya, Abuja bomb blast, where the writer lost a former
classmate and the only son of his parents.
Concerned fora like
the Northern Elders Forum, a socio-political organization, had in 2012
submitted a document to the then President, where they identified the Boko Haram insurgency as a major
national issue and made several recommendations from both the security,
political and socio-economic aspects. Amongst their recommendation in respect
of the security aspect was for GEJ to rather employ dialogue in the fight
against Boko Haram. GEJ seemed to
have bought into this idea of dialogue at first, but had to succumb when the
pressure came from some quarters that he was dialoguing with those who wanted
to Islamize Nigeria. He dropped the idea, and that was when he came up with the
idea of state of emergency which was in force up to May, 2014. The idea of dialogue
to me might not have been a totally bad one if it had been properly positioned
and understood. Remember the uprising of the Niger Delta militants then. You
would agree with me that Nigeria only saw light at the end of the tunnel when
the Nigerian government presented a peaceful picture to the militants, and made
it clear that the government was no longer at war with them, and called them
out to negotiate. It was through this negotiation that the reasons for the
agitations of the militants became known, when they showed the Nigerian
government that they produced billions of dollars for the Nigerian government
from their backyards, yet they lacked everything. Before this dialogue, the
Joint Task Force (JTF) which had held sway in the region practically achieved
no stability. In the case of the Boko Haram
insurgents, the idea of dialogue here, to me, would not have been that the
government would call out the faceless insurgents and start negotiating with
them. No, that would not have been feasible and achievable. What the idea of
dialogue in that instance would have meant would be the Nigerian government
making it clear that it was no longer at war with the insurgents and in the
mean time, stop every form of offensive against them, and deploy the secret
service agents to infiltrate the towns and villages where the insurgents had
held sway, with a view to gathering credible intelligence concerning the group,
including their perceived agitations, their sponsors, and a possible way to
assuage their demands. By this, people who knew and had lived with the
insurgents would have the confidence to speak out. The Nigerian government in
the end would have gathered enough intelligence on what the perceived
agitations of the insurgents are, and the best way to assuage them. Aside the
meaning of the full name of the group, which simply means that “Western
education is evil”, nobody knows what the group is fighting for to this day.
The Joint Task Force employed in the stead of dialogue did not achieve much, as
it was merely an occupation force which only instilled fear in the communities
where they operated, rather than instilling confidence in them. Only this
confidence would have enabled information gathering in these communities.
Characteristic of
the corruption which had become rife in his administration, the fight against Boko Haram soon became another avenue
for feeding fat in the vast Nigerian resources, mainly by the Service Chiefs,
and the National Security Adviser. The writer came to startling revelations in this
respect when he had cause to represent Col. D.B Dazang at the General Court-Marshal
in Abuja, and in the matter pending against the NSA at the Federal High Court
in Abuja. These particular incidents revealed the mess in the purported fight
against the Boko Haram insurgency, and
why the fight could not be won under GEJ’s watch. The Service Chiefs would each
time approach GEJ with a view to selling different ideas to him for the fight
against the insurgency, with the aim of only getting approval for fat sums
which they eventually transfer to their bank accounts. Always, GEJ without clue
in respect of such ideas sold to him only approved, including having to additionally
borrow $1 billion in the purported fight. The NSA would sabotage any
arrangement by the Service Chiefs or any such purported award of contract for
the purchase of any weapon unless his cut had been agreed on. The fact that
unconfirmed report today has it that N3
trillion had been traced to the accounts of Sambo Dasuki, the NSA under GEJ lends
credence to this. The soldiers were therefore not equipped for any battle
against the insurgents who carried more sophisticated weapons; those who had
the gut to complain over such apparent suicide missions they were being sent on
in the name of the fight against the insurgents were court-marshaled and
sentenced to death, so that the business can go on. GEJ never approached the
Nigerian neighbours or the UN in the fight, and was at no point, the real
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. I wonder if he ever gave a single command
himself throughout the purported fight under his watch. Compare this for
instance with President Bush during the 9/11 attack of the US when two hijacked
planes had hit the twin towers of the World Trade Center in a suicide attack,
with another intelligence that a 3rd hijacked plane was on the
loose. The most viable option then was to shoot down this plane, even though it
carried Americans, but the Military Chiefs needed the Orders of the President
first before the Fighter Jets could be deployed for that purpose. The American
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces rose to the occasion, and the plane was
eventually brought down, though not by American Fighter Jets, but by the
passengers themselves- that’s the American spirit.
No doubt, the fight
against the Boko Haram insurgency had
been caught in the web of Nigerian national politics, reminiscent of our
political level. There had been recriminations at both ends of the divide,
represented by the North and South. The Northerners had consistently accused
the South and GEJ’s government of politicizing the fight against Boko Haram, with a bid to winning GEJ a
re-election in 2015. Even the international communities appeared to have
equally seen it as such, as they withdrew their support. The US blatantly
refused to sell arms to Nigeria as a result of this. On the other hand, the
South accused the North, including the incumbent President that they created Boko Haram because they lost power and
wanted to gain it back. Today, the fact that the insurgency group is going
about killing both northerners and southerners, Christians and Muslims, has
cast serious doubt as to any merit in this accusation by the South against the
North. The truth remains that Gwoza, Bama, Baga remain the most devastated
today by reason of this insurgency, and not any Southern town; to say the least
of any agenda. Certain quarters of Nigeria even believed the incumbent
President had a hand in Boko Haram,
and even when they did not support him in his electioneering campaign, they
believed that if he won, he would talk to ‘his boys’ to stop. But the fact
today remains that Boko Haram again
struck in Maiduguri some twelve hours after PMB took oath of office, defying
such shared sentiments. The attacks have since continued in Borno, Yobe, Kaduna
and Adamawa. Thus, it is now obvious that the insurgency is a menace we must
all fight, as it is no longer anybody’s agenda. The fight must transcend our
national boundaries if we must win same
To this effect, the
effort of PMB since his inauguration on May 29, 2015 is most commendable. He
did not have to think before knowing that a fight of this magnitude cannot be
won with the Military Chiefs giving orders from their lush mansions in Abuja, a
strategy which GEJ had no clue to. If the Military Command Headquarters had
been in Maiduguri all this while, it would no doubt, have instilled a sense of
responsibility in the Military Chiefs. They would not need a necromancer to
tell them that being in enemy territory, they could also become statistics if
they failed to discharge their duties diligently. That is why the moving of the
Military Command Headquarters from Abuja to Maiduguri by PMB is a first attempt
at winning the war, and that shows mastery. He had since visited Nigerian
neighbours of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger Republic, to solicit their support in
the fight against Boko Haram. I
consider this a welcome development also because, as I have had course to say
elsewhere, no matter how poor these countries may be, the fact remained that
during GEJ’s regime, the Armies of these countries were better organized than
that of Nigeria. It is immaterial the feat the Nigerian Army had achieved in
the past in peace keeping missions. This became evident when, in the bid to protect
their own borders, they joined the Nigerian troops towards the tail end of
GEJ’s administration. The Nigerian troops arguably started winning the fight
principally by the efforts of these Countries. With their cooperation, more
feats would be achieved in the fight, as there would not be any hiding place
for the insurgents when they are driven out of a particular location. PMB has equally
approached the international community, who have pledged their support in the
fight. Since the inauguration of PMB, Canada, USA, UK, and France have since
pledged their support for his administration. He had met the America President,
and there are a whole lot of invitations pending for him from different Heads
of State.
On the part of
Nigeria, if this collective effort must yield the desired result in the effort
to win the war, the fight must transcend our national boundaries, and we should
eschew politicizing it. Nigerians must see the insurgency as a common problem,
and every effort channeled towards the fight should be appreciated, including
the sacrifices of Nigerian soldiers. To this effect, no section of the country
should see the appointment of military chiefs or such security chiefs in the
fight as an attempt to propagate the agenda of any particular region or nation.
We should be confident in the efforts of PMB to succeed in the fight against Boko Haram, and respect his choices of
personnel.
Having said all
these, on the other hand, if you ask me if I see PMB winning the war in four
years, I would tell you that the greatest undoing of Nigeria in the first place
was to allow the terrorist group grow from a splinter group to an armed group
this day. I blame the Nigerian secret service agencies for this neglect. I say
this because I have never seen any terrorist organization completely
disintegrate after its formation. To this end, if PMB is able to infiltrate
their ranks, weaken them and make it impossible for them to utilize their major
weapon, suicide bombing in the next four years, I would say he had succeeded in
the fight against Boko Haram.
